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For the EEC Commissioner for Development
Cooperation, Edgard Pisani, there is no doubt about
the answer to the question posed in the title.
'Development policy', he has claimed, 'is a cornerstone
of European integration'. Why? Because 'it is a
manifestation of Europe's identity in the world at
large and a major plank in the Community's external
policies generally. . .' [EEC 1982a: 1]. This implies that
development policy is good for Europe, because it
promotes Community spirit and allows the Ten to
present a united front to the world at large. But is it
good for the Third World? Is there anything that the
European Community does, or could do, that the
member states acting alone could not achieve?
The articles in this Bulletin set out to identify areas for
an EEC initiative. All are based upon papers presented
to a conference held at the IDS in June 1982 on the
theme of 'Europe and the South in the 1980s:
Prospects for Political Change'.' Most have since been
revised substantially, to take account both of the
comments made at the conference, and of the effects of
subsequent events. All of them take it as given that
there will continue to be a set of Community-level
policies on North-South issues, in addition to policies
established at a member-state level. This is almost
certainly a realistic expectation, at least for the rest of
this decade. But there remains plenty of scope for
nuances within this bifurcated overall approach:
Community-level policy can be increased or decreased
in scale vis-à-vis national-level policy. Commissioner
Pisani has already made a move to extend his role. He
has, for instance, proposed - andthe Commission
(although ntst the member states) has accepted - that
the volume of Community-level aid should be doubled
to I per cent of EEC GNP, if necessary simply by
increasing the proportion of European aid that is
channelled through the Community institutions [EEC
1982a:42]. Yet, at the same time, the Community's
North-South policy is under threat. On the trade front,
growing pressure for nationally-based non-tariff
barriers (NTB) to imports threatens to undermine
Community-level policies. As far as aid is concerned,
at a time of stagnant or falling disbursements, there is
The conference was financed by the European Commission's
Directorate-General for Information (DG lo).
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growing competition between différent outlets;
Denmark's contribution to Community aid, for
example, has come mainly at the expense of the UNDP
[Svendsen 1983].
Given these options, it is worth going back to first
principles and asking whether the South has anything
to gain from a unification of European North-South
policy and, related to this, whether the Community
has special features which give it a comparative
advantage in undertaking certain types of activity.
Pisani has proposed that the volume of
Community-level aid should be doubled to one
per cent of EEC GNP.
Characteristics of a Community Posture
Fundamentals
There are two levels at which the characteristics of the
Community's current stance on North-South issues
and its potential can be discussed. First, there are
questions about the inherent features of a Community-
level position: what is it that the EEC can do precisely
because it is a Community that the member states and
bodies such as the World Bank and the UN agencies
cannot do? Second, there is the more prosaic level of
tactical realities: are there ways the EEC can act which
are not open to member states simply because of how
things happen to be organised?
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Comment has tended to concentrate on the second,
tactical, level of analysis. Probably this is not because
of any failure by commentators to appreciate the
importance of strategy. Rather, it is a reflection of the
absence of anything much to say at the strategic level.
There are remarkably few features of current
Community policy that set it apart, fundamentally,
from what is being done elsewhere by others. Even the
most radical proposals for the future tend to
concentrate on shifting onto a pan-European basis,
policies that are already being implemented by one or
more of the member states, or which could equally be
organised on a Community or a national basis. Hence
the Commission's proposal to use the European
Monetary System to foster monetary stability in the
African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) signatories of
the Lomé Convention [EEC 1982a:44], has the air of
an extension of the long-established franc zone in
West Africa.
The Commission has made brave, attempts to
establish the unique credentials of an EEC approach
to the Third World. 'Community development
policy', it has asserted, 'is distinct from the member
states' bilateral policies, and is seen as a separate entity
by the countries benefiting. It is not an eleventh policy
superimposed on the ten others. It is the expression,
not multilateral but collective, of a Community which
has neither the attributes nor the ambitions of a state
but which nevertheless has great capabilities . . . The
Community is seen as a responsible actor on the
international stage and as a natural forum for
concerting and coordinating the member states'
national policies and positions' [EEC 1982a:15]. But
such claims are hard to justify.
In practice, possibly the most tangible feature of EEC
policy that can reasonably be characterised as
uniquely Communautaire, is its predilection for
regional groupings. As Reg Green has remarked
elsewhere [Green 1983], 'birds of a feather flock
together', and this has been a starting point for a
dialogue between the EEC and the Southern African
Development Coordinating Conference (SADCC).
The EEC's preferences are evident in its network of
formal relations with the Third World. The Lomé
Convention is the most obvious example of this. Ever
since Lomé I was signed in 1975 with 46 (now 63) ACP
states, the EEC has tended to sing its praises to three
melodies: its contractual nature, its package of aid and
trade, and its uniqueness as an agreement between two
regional groups. So proud is the Community of Lomé,
that it has been reluctant to spend the aid that it has
earmarked for Angola and Mozambique, the two
remaining independent Black African states that are
not signatories, and it has exerted considerable
pressure to persuade them to join the 'Lomé III' talks.
But Lomé is not the only example of the EEC's
predilection for regional pacts. It is the most fully
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developed only because the Community has been
unwilling to accord a similar range and depth of
preferences to other, more competitive, countries. The
desire to establish a single agreement with the
Mediterranean region is of long-standing. The goal is
as far removed as ever, but as a first step the
Commission has proposed that Europe should 'arrive
swiftly at a position on the broad outlines of the
Mediterranean policy which it feels it should promote
in the future' [EEC 1982b: 19]. The eventual aim is for
'a global convention between the two regions, along
the lines of the Lomé Convention. . . (which) would
balance relations and so make them less vulnerable to
sectoral or immediate economic difficulties' [EEC
1982b: 17].
Elsewhere, the EEC has organised its bilateral pacts
with the ASEAN states within an overall framework
agreement. While the framework agreement has little
substance of its own, it does appear to have fostered a
political commitment, as evidenced by the annual
foreign ministers' meetings which are star-studded
affairs; no less than seven European foreign ministers
attended the 1983 gathering in Bangkok. Similar
framework agreements are being touted for South
Asia and the Andean Pact countries, and the decision
at the end of 1982 to provide additional aid to Central
America marks the beginning of a move to consider
this area as a single region (with possible implications
for Europe's links with the Caribbean).
Within Lomé and some of the other agreements, there
are aid tranches specifically earmarked for regional
projects. The record on implementation has not been
particularly brilliant, By the end of 1981 the ratio of
disbursements to commitments for regional projects
financed from the Lomé I aid package was almost 19
per cent lower than the average for all projects, which
itself was lamentably low. Total spending on regional
projects was less than disbursements made, for
example, to Senegal and Guinea-Bissau together. But
these figures may paint too gloomy a picture. The EEC
has played a useful role, for example, in acting as a
financial midwife at the birth of SADCC.
If this tendency towards regionalism is a hallmark of
Community action, is it a good thing? Given the
problems caused by disunity among developing
countries, the answer to this question might appear
self-evident: anything that fosters unity has something
to be said for it. The first Lomé Convention
negotiations were marked by a welcome breaking
down of barriers between anglophone and francophone
African states, and this unity has since been
institutionalised in the organisations spawned by the
Convention, most notably the ACP committee of
ambassadors and the ACP secretariat.
But the unity fostered by the EEC is of a very partial
and idiosyncratic variety. Europe selects the regional
groups with which it will deal on the basis of
perceptions of its own self-interest. Sometimes, this
produces an overlap with an existing association of
developing countries, as in the Caribbean basin where,
for example, the EEC has recognised the existence of
Caricom in its negotiations for sugar purchases (in
contrast to the USA which, in its Caribbean Basin
Initiative, has tended to undermine existing regional
groups).2 Sometimes, however, there is no such
overlap and the EEC may be a divisive influence. The
Arab League has complained, for instance, of
Europe's practice of dividing its members into four
groups - the Maghreb, the Mashreq, the ACP, and
the rest (mainly the Gulf) - none of which has any
real meaning outside Community parlance.
The same applies at a global level, where the EEC's
regionalism is accused of undermining Third World
unity. This charge is given added bite by the fact that
the favours accorded by the EEC to some states are in
practice preferences over other Third World states.
Thus the ACP countries are given a veto, in practice if
not in theory, over extensions to the EEC's generalised
system of preferences (GSP), to ensure that other
Third World states do not improve their relative
position. More fundamentally, some actors within the
Community regard Lomé not simply as a pragmatic
accord but as a model for a future organisation of
world economic relations to replace the principles of
universality and non-discrimination established after
World War II. The Commission's major restatement
of development policy in 1982 affirmed that Lomé is a
precursor of a more fully developed set of agreements
that will replace the traditional framework of
relations between nation states . . . with a system of
relations between regional groups or major continental
units basing their relations on the predictability and
security of a contract.. .' [EEC 1982a:3l]. Too much
should not be read into such statements of principle
that probably have little chance of being translated
into practice, at least overtly. It should be recalled that
when the Lomé Convention was signed, it was
accompanied by dark murmerings of neo-colonialism,
and attacked as a ploy to bind Africa more closely to
Europe's coat tails in an essentially exploitative
relationship.3 In the face of Lomé's failure to produce
any very substantial effect, for good or ill, such
criticism has subsided of late, even though recent
analysis of trade flows under Lomé I has shown that
Europe has done better than have the ACP states
[Moss 1983]. Nonetheless, this statement of Com-
mission policy is very revealing of the philosophy that
2This comparison of the USA's Caribbean Basin Initiative and EEC
policy is taken further in Blackburn and Merry [1983].
3Shaw [1979] provides an extensive review of the various positions
from which Lomé has been analysed.
underlies the advocacy of regionalism by some
Community policy-makers.
Superficials
It seems, therefore, that there are few very substantial
characteristics of a Community-level North-South
policy to distinguish it from national policies.
However, there are features of current Community-
level policy that set apart from those of the member
states in many small and a few large ways. Together
with its propensity for regionalism, these provide a
signpost for the direction in which EEC policy could
move during the rest of the decade. But, at the same
time, the bases of Community-level policy are under
pressure.
Probably the most important feature of Community
decision-making on North-South issues is the fact
that, as Ramphal notes, within the Commission the
Commissioner for Development Cooperation has a
much higher profile than do any of the aid ministers in
the member states. He is a fully fledged member of the
Commission, equal in status to other Commissioners,
whereas most national aid ministers are of non-
cabinet rank. The most important elements of the
EEC's economic relations with the Third World are
the common policies on trade and agriculture, and the
partly common policy on aid. Largely because of the
Lomé Convention, the Commissioner for Develop-
ment Cooperation has a finger in each of these pies
(albeit a rather small one in agriculture). Moreover, on
trade matters, his quasi-ministry, DG 8 (the
Directorate-General for Development), shares the
field not with a department representing the interests
of domestic industry, but with the Directorate-
General for External Relations (DG 1). The combi-
nation of this wide range of bona fide interests
(however tenuous some of them may be in practice)
and the Commissioner's 'cabinet' status gives him the
potential to poke his nose into the whole range of
North-South policies.
Furthermore, the overall orientation of the Commis-
sion is one that favours the type of positive action
recommended by the 'mutual interests' school. Two
such proposals are presented in this Bulletin by Lai
Jayawardena and Alain Dangeard on financial
recycling. They share a salient characteristic with all
proposals of this kind in that they require Northern
governments both to recognise a mutual interest and
to act upon it. Unfortunately, in practice governments
have a tendency to react to events rather than to take
major initiatives. Not so the Commission; its mandate
is precisely one of making proposals and taking
initiatives to which the Council reacts.
This combination of factors - a high profile
development minister, with a wide range of potential
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interests, and the Commission's mandate to take
initiates - has produced some remarkably bold
statements that would find considerable favour in the
mutual interests school. In 1981, for example, in
preparation for the Ottawa Western economic
summit, it proposed a package of initiatives on energy
(recognising both the need for more exploration, inter
alia via a World Bank energy affiliate, and the need for
conservation in the industrialised countries), on
finance (including an increase in resources for the IMF
and World Bank, new forms of resource transfer such
as bonds, and inflation-proofing OPEC's financial
assets as part of a programme to improve the stability
of the financial system), on food and agriculture
(which acknowledged the need for the EEC to alter its
own practices) and, perhaps most significantly, on the
need for Europe to restructure its own industrial and
trade relations [EEC 1981].
Of course, such proposals are usually given fairly short
shrift by the Council of Ministers. But, at a time of
dwindling official interest in the Third World, it is a
modest plus for the Community that an organisation
exists with a brief to put before the member states at
regular intervals a broad programme that recognises
that Europe is as much a cause of the problem as part
of the solution. In this the Commission has, so far,
been assisted by the European Parliament which has
also taken a very broad view of North-South policy.
Soon after its inauguration as an elected assembly it
devoted the energies of five committees for the space
of a year to pondering 'Hunger in the World', and
produced a report recognising that the causes of
hunger are far wider than, simply, the inadequate
agricultural policies of developing countries, and that
a number of the most potent have their origins in
Europe's own policies. The Parliament's resolution
[EEC 1980] recognises that the elimination of World
Hunger implies 'far-reaching adjustments to the
production methods and way of life in the
industrialised countries' and 'a massive transfer of
financial and technological resources to the least-
favoured regions and countries' (para 5). Hence, while
it contains a long (and useful) catalogue of changes
required in the developing countries, it also flotes that
'the more advanced countries should adapt their
commercial policies, above all as regards trade in food
and other agricultural products, to developing
countries' requirements' (para 63) and in particular
'requests the Commission to draw up a trade policy in
the agricultural sector which would be compatible
with the Community's development policy' (para 45),
a request that has so far gone unheeded!
To set against these positive features of Community
policy are some quite clear defects which affect in
particular the more traditional aspects of Third World
policy. The problems of the EEC aid programme can
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be summed up in the observation that it is 'designed by
a committee', with all that this implies. Within the
complicated aid structure the degree of Commission
autonomy varies between one type of aid and another.
It has most control (in the sense of relative autonomy
and an administration that is relatively adequate for
the task) in relation to the Lomé aid programme, and
least in relation to food aid. As a result, food aid is
often a shambles, but even Lomé aid is heavily
constrained. Most aid agencies are responsible to
some higher authority which must give its approval to
proposed aid projects. In theory, the Commission is
more independent that most since its 'higher
authority' for Lomé aid projects - the EDF
Committee representing the Ten member states - can
only express a view, not take a decision, on accepting
or rejecting. In practice, however, the control
exercised by the European Development Fund (EDF)
Committee is particularly intrusive. Michael Lipton
has noted that the Board of the Wor'd Bank has never
rejected a project recommended to it by the Bank staff
[Lipton 1983]. In the case of the EEC, by contrast, the
views expressed by the EDF committee are rarely if
ever ignored.
Moreover, the Commission is not its own master in
ordering its house. The member states set the number
of staff that can be employed and nominate the senior
officials. The split in career structure between the
officials of DG 8 and those of the delegations in the
ACP states came about partly because of a deliberate
attempt by the Commission to side-step the iron hand
of the member states, and it has had unfortunate
administrative consequences. The short truth is that
DG 8 is too small to administer the aid programmes
for which it is responsible in the manner in which it
and the Council would like the programme to be
administered. This statement begs several questions,
of course: whether staffing would be adequate if the
programme were administered in a different manner
- for example, by giving the receiving countries
greater freedom to decide on the detailed use of aid; or
of whether DG 8 makes the most efficient use of the
staff that it does possess. The point to note, however, is
that the Commission's capacity to adapt itself so as to
become an efficient aid agency is heavily constrained
by factors outside its control.
Moreover, as Michael Lipton points out in his article,
the scrutiny of implementation that is provided by the
Court of Auditors, while 'useful in detecting graft or
incompetence . . . is of little value in establishing the
vital facts sought by project evaluation. . .'. In view of
the new thrust of EEC development policy, which is
described in the next section, the conclusion that he
draws from his catalogue of the EEC's administrative
shortcomings is particularly relevant. The conclusion
is that 'lack of evaluation, let alone of a "lesson-
learning" mechanism is especially damaging in
rural development . . . EEC aid suffers from being
neither bilateral nor multilateral, neither centralised
nor decentralised . . . Rural projects . . . are especially
vulnerable to the resulting problems
Directions for EEC policy in the 1980s
The EEC Commission has sought to establish a new
direction for its Third World policy in its memorandum
of October 1982 [EEC 1982a], a document that is very
closely linked with the Commissioner for Develop-
ment Cooperation and, for this reason, is usually
known as the 'Pisani Memorandum'.4 The preceding
section suggested that, apart from its regional
orientation, the Commission's major asset is its broad
view of North-South issues, and its greatest weakness
is its relative ineffectiveness as an aid agency with
problems that bear particularly heavily on rural
development. Ironically, the thrust of the Pisani
Memorandum, in a nutshell, appears to be an
emphasis on the Commission's role as an aid agency,
especially in the rural sector, with a neglect (relatively
if not absolutely) of the broad picture.
The memorandum continues the practice of dividing
the Third World into a hierarchy of zones among
which Africa (and, to a lesser extent, the Caribbean
and the Pacific) and the Mediterranean dominate. It is
likely, therefore, that this new approach will make
itself felt first in policies towards these regions and, in
particular, in the year-long negotiations for a
successor to Lomé II which commence in September
1983. The Commission has already proposed to the
Council its views for the conduct of these negotiations.
A major feature of the Pisani Memorandum, as
amplified in the proposed 'Lomé III' mandate, is that
aid should be better coordinated and more coherently
focused on promoting what is called autonomous and
self-centred development, in that all efforts, both
industrial and agricultural, should be oriented in the
first place to satisfying domestic demand. In respect of
agriculture, therefore, the EEC is taking a stance that
is clearly opposed to that of the Berg Report,5 and
claims an affinity with the Lagos Plan [OAU 1981]. It
is less certain, however, whether the same affinity with
the Lagos Plan can be claimed in respect of industry.
When combined with the Pisani Memorandum's
reticence on the issue of European industrial
restructuring (in contrast to earlier Commission
documents) it sounds more like an attempt to head off
ACP efforts to export manufactures to the EEC.
In their details, how do these documents measure up
to the prescriptions made in this Bulletin? Ramphal
iFor a further summary of the Pisani Memorandum proposals see
ODI [1983J and Stevens [1983a, l983b].
5See Allison [1983] for an assessment of the Berg Report.
recognises that there is some truth in the EEC's view of
itself as a bloc with particular interests at stake in the
Third World. Given the negative posture of the
current US Administration, he asks whether Europe
has the will to take the action prescribed by its own
rhetoric: 'can Europe overcome its sense of
dependency on the Americans at least in the interest of
recalling the United States to its own tradition of
compassion, generosity and internationalism?'. Com-
missioner Pisani would undoubtedly reply that it
should do so, but it is not so clear that he would agree
with other elements in the prescription. For, if Europe
is to take the lead, Ramphal has no doubt that
'Europe-South cooperation cannot . . . be confined
within the parameters of Lomé as it stands', and he
warns that it 'is not feasible to contemplate a regime of
relations between Europe and the South in the 1980s
which leaves North-South issues stagnating on the
periphery, while Europe and the South - or parts of it
- pursue the illusion of patchwork change'. Debt,
protectionism, and the role of the IMF and World
Bank are central concerns.6
The 1933 World Economic Conference came too late
to avert the great depression; will the verdict of history
on the failed GATT Ministerial of November 1982 be
the same? Vincent Cable explains the results of
selective protectionism on the UK economy using the
Cambridge growth model. He uses the model to
simulate the effect of import controls on textiles/cloth-
ing and vehicles. The conclusion is that 'the gain in
output and employment accruing from selective
protection of one industry will be offset in part or total
by employment and output losses elsewhere in the
economy'.
In contrast to this gloomy prospect, Ramphal recalls
the imagination that inspired the Marshall Plan. A
similar degree of imaginative self-interest is urged by
Lal Jayawardena who puts forward a new system for
recycling petrodollars. He proposes that the EEC
should take advantage of the current soft oil market to
introduce unilaterally an inflation-indexed security
which would provide an attractive home for OPEC
surpluses on one condition: that OPEC exercises
restraint in its oil price increases. Linked to this he
proposes a reciprocal offer by OPEC surplus countries
to convert their oil price increases into concessional
loans to oil-importing developing countries. Alain
Dangeard addresses the same issue, and argues that
the details of such recycling schemes matter less than
their spirit which 'tries to make interdependence work
iThere is no surer way to unpopularity in DG 8 than to compare its
activities unfavourably with those of the World Bank which, together
with the IMF, are known in Euro-speak by the code name financing
bodies'. Il is clearly lo the World Bank that the Pisani Memorandum
is referring when it caustically notes that one might be forgiven for
thinking that the point of aid is not to put an end to intolerable hard-
ships, but to fund the safest, most profitable investment' [EEC
l982a:7].
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in practice by providing each partner with an
appropriate mix of incentives'. Instead of Jaya-
wardena's recycling proposals, he suggests that
European and OPEC investors should collaborate to
finance sectoral priority programmes in developing
countries which are identified through joint discussions
with the host government. Such programmes 'should
cover agricultural self-sufficiency, energy diversifi-
cation, raw materials contribution to development
and industrial development'.
This sectoral approach is much closer to the EEC
Commission's views as expressed in the Pisani
Memorandum and the Lomé mandate proposal,
which seek a policy dialogue in the sectors of food and
agriculture, energy, industry and minerals. So far,
Community thinking is most fully developed in
relation to the first of these sectors - food and
agriculture. Michael Lipton welcomes Commissioner
Pisani's new approach which, if it works (a big caveat)
'will constitute an enormous advance on earlier
approaches to its relationship with the ACP states',
and he 'seeks to clarify some of the issues and
requirements facing any EEC programme to assist
African countries in developing food strategies'. He
concludes that 'Africa's increasing net food imports
are its central development constraint, that growing
hunger is its central poverty problem. . .' and that the
pressing need is for 'research-oriented strategies for
high-income, low-risk, labour-intensive small farming'.
The burden of the Commission's public thinking so far
has been to question whether African governments
can devise and adhere to such strategies. But what is
equally germane to the question is whether the EEC
can respond adequately when such strategies emerge.
The Bible has something apposite to say about the
relative attention to be given to 'motes' and 'beams'
that impair the faculties. It might be objected that this
puts the relative proportions the wrong way around:
that while Europe has its faults they are mere motes
compared to the beams that hinder African
development. But this is only true if the discussion is
limited to development cooperation narrowly defined,
and even then the EEC's schoolmarmly lecturing
strikes as presumptuous: it wags a finger at Africa's
administrative failings, and then cannot deliver food
aid within two years of when it was requested; it
criticises inadequate African agricultural policies
without even blushing at its own failures to devise a
rational food policy.
If the discussion is broadened, the relative importance
of the mote and beam change drastically. Edward Clay
provides just such a broadening. He points a truth that
is often overlooked by those who pronounce on the
problems of hunger and poverty in the Third World:
'there is not so much a single problem of world hunger
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as related sets of problems which have different
implications for policy at national and international
levels'. While some EEC policies may provide a
palliative, others are contributing directly to the
problem. A major cause of food insecurity is 'that
many more developing countries have become
vulnerable to movements in the world economy
because of structural changes in their agricultural and
food sectors'. In its own attempt to achieve food
security through the CAP, the EEC has thrust
insecurity on to others: 'the external consequence of
such policies as followed by the EEC . . . is that the
burden of adjustment in world markets falls
particularly heavily on the US livestock sector and on
developing countries'.
While food is Commissioner Pisani's top priority,
mining and energy have figured prominently in past
negotiations with the ACP, and are likely to do so
again in 1983. Mike Faber, Carlos Fortin and Adrian
Hewitt review the experience of the various mining
related instruments in Lomé II, such as Sysmin, and
find that the record is disappointing. They propose
three new initiatives that could be to the mutual
benefit of both the EEC and the ACP. One is that a
new scheme is required to promote exploration. Given
that 'the wider the community of potential customers
who undertake such funding the more certain are they
collectively to reap the benefit' such schemes are 'in
concept, singularly appropriate for Community
initiatives'. Further, they identify the need for
emergency purchases of minerals from selected ACP
countries when prices are exceptionally low. This
would not be a buffer stock scheme, but one 'to
provide support to selected mineral producers in times
of distress'. Finally, they support the concept of
mineral revenue stabilisation funds backed by 'benign
conditionality' and designed 'to provide insurance
against an inability to maintain development
programmes in periods of slump' and 'to regulate
domestic demand stimulated by government expendi-
ture by preventing such demand from building up in
boom periods'. Francisco Parra provides additional
thoughts about the nature of Third World energy
problems and the most desirable focus for external
assistance.
How well does all this analysis and advice marry with
the views of the Pisani Memorandum? There is general
support for sector strategies that provide more
flexible, coherent and better-designed assistance, but
these should not be at the expense of the broader
elements of North-South relations. The Commission
should not forget that perhaps its most tangible claim
to uniqueness as far as the Third World is concerned is
that it has Europe's only minister for North-South
relations.
One area in which these two levels of concern overlap,
and where Europe could make a significant
contribution concerns conditionality. Sector strategies,
if they mean anything at all, imply a shift towards
programme lending. The problem is that programme
lending inevitably involves the lender in setting policy
conditions. The conditionality imposed by the leading
programme lender, the IMF, is of a particularly
unpalatable variety for many developing countries,
and they have been reluctant to accept IMF assistance
as a result (although their severely deepening
problems are now giving them little option). At its
best, the Lomé relationship does provide a forum for a
constructive dialogue in which new forms of sectoral
conditionality could be hammered out. It takes two
sides to conduct a dialogue, and it is not yet certain
that the ACP will respond to Pisani's invitation. But
they are more likely to do so if Commissioner Pisani
has something to offer them, in the form of
improvements in donor practice to complement any
changes to which the recipients agree. At present he
has rather little to offer them, partly because the
Commission does not have the power to alter its
practice. What is required is for the EEC to offer to
remove the inefficiencies and rigidities in the aid it
provides to sector strategies that have been agreed
with the recipient. In many cases this will involve
giving the recipient much greater discretion in using
the aid, and reducing the scope of the member states to
interfere. It is to the Council of Ministers, therefore,
that we must look now, to see if it can respond
constructively to the ideas thrown up by the
Commission.
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